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Abstract
We present a simple model of corporate tax evasion allowing for potentially bad govern-
ments that abuse their ￿scal powers to extort monies from ￿rms. Our model shows that the
potential existence of extortionist governments provides incentives for corporate tax evasion
and increases enforcement cost.
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1 Introduction
The right of governments to exercise ￿scal power through taxation sometimes leads to its abuse
by public o￿cials. Tax enforcement provides a very powerful tool for extortion in countries
where the government has control over enforcing agencies and courts. Extortion can take the
form of overstated tax obligations or arbitrary ￿nancial punishment of (not existent) tax evasion
by ￿rms.1 It is easier for a malicious government to control enforcement agencies and courts if
law institutions are week and/or a lack of separation of power exists. Week institutions allow for
control through bribery, while the lack of separation of power provides leeway for direct in￿uence.
Both corrupt courts and the lack of checks and balances is readily observed in developing and
transition economies. These countries quite regularly already su￿er from problems to create
su￿cient revenue from taxation. So it is interesting to investigate the in￿uence of potentially
extortionist governments on tax revenues and enforcement cost.
This paper models the tax evasion decision of a ￿rm if it is uncertain about the kind of
government is faces. So far, the not particularly extensive literature on corporate tax evasion
has mainly focused on the in￿uence of tax evasion and enforcement on production decisions.2
Recently, the oganization structure of ￿rms and its in￿uence on tax evasion has been analyzed
by Chen and Chu (2002) and by Crocker and Slemrod (2004). The papers most closely related
to our analysis are Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo (1999), who propose an optimal tax system
in the presence of evasion, corruption and extortion, and Cule and Fulton (2005), who explain
the positive correlation of evasion and corruption by the complementary nature of the shadow
economy and corruption activity.
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1The russion YUKOS case is considered by many observers as such government extortion. Mikhail Khodor-
kovsky, owner of energy giant YUKOS was jailed for 9 years after he was found guilty of tax evasion. The most
pro￿table parts of the ￿rm were auctioned o￿ in order to settle the tax repayments. In the intransparent auction
a ￿rm with Kremlin links purchased the assets. US congressman Tom Lantos comented: \It seems that this
political trial before a kangaroo court has come to a shameful conclusion." See the BBC’s website for further
details (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4595289.stm).
2Examples are Marrelli (1984), Wang and Conant (1988), Marrelli and Martina (1988), Virmani (1989), Lee
(1998) and Bayer and Cowell (2006).
1In our model a ￿rm decides on its pro￿t declaration for tax purposes, while being uncer-
tain about the objective of the government. A government may be \good" or \bad", where a
good government just wants to collect revenue and prevent tax evasion, while a bad government
engages in extortion. We ￿nd that the prior probability of facing an extortionist government
increases tax-evasion incentives. Therefore the potential for extortion undermines revenue col-
lection of good governments. Moreover, the prior probability of ￿rms facing a bad government
increases the expected equilibrium audit-e￿ort of good governments, which reduces net revenue
and increases ine￿ciencies.
2 The model
Consider two players: a ￿rm i and the government (or its tax authority) g: The ￿rm may be
pro￿table or not. This is private information to the ￿rm. The gross pro￿t is ￿ 2 f0;￿g; with
￿ 2 (0;1) denoting the commonly known prior probability for ￿ = ￿:
The government may be of type ￿g = 0 (a well meaning good government) or of type ￿b = 1
(a malicious extortive government). The prior probability for ￿ = ￿b is denoted by ￿ 2 (0;1).
2.1 Timing
1. Nature independently draws the types of the ￿rm and the government.
2. Both players learn their own types.
3. The ￿rm declares its pro￿t di 2 f0;￿g:
4. The government observes di and takes an action ag 2 fnothing;audit;extortg:
5. The payo￿s are realized.
2.2 Payo￿s





￿ ￿ tdi if ag = nothing
￿ ￿ tdi ￿ (f + t)maxf0;￿ ￿ dig if ag = audit
￿ ￿ ￿F ￿ tdi if ag = extort
(1)
where t is the (linear) tax rate, f is the surcharge on detected tax evasion, and F denotes the
fraction of the pro￿t that can be extorted.





tdi if ag = nothing
tdi + (f + t)maxf0;￿ ￿ dig ￿ K if ag = audit
tdi + ￿F ￿ C(￿) if ag = extort
(2)
Here K denotes the audit cost, while C(￿) denotes the cost a government has to bear whenever
it extorts. This cost can be interpreted as the sum of transaction, bribery and reputation cost
arising from extortion. We assume C(￿) = cK=￿; with c < 1 to ensure that a good government
does not want to extort, while a bad government has no scruples to do so.3 Additionally, we
assume that the gross revenue from extortion exceeds that from punishing an evading ￿rm:
F > f + t: (3)
3Note that 1 ￿ c measures the relative cost e￿ectiveness of extortion compared to auditing.
2The fraction of the pro￿t that can be extorted F in reality depends on the degree of control
the government has over courts and enforcement agencies. A tighter grip increases the fraction
of pro￿t that can be extorted.
2.3 Solving the game
We use Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium as a solution concept for this dynamic game of
incomplete information. We see - by using equations (2) and (3) - that for a bad government
auditing is a dominated strategy. Furthermore in case of a declaration of di = ￿; extortion
always pays for a bad government
a￿
g(￿b;di = ￿) = fextortg:
Whether a bad government tries to extort if a zero declaration is observed or just does
nothing depends on the believed probability that the ￿rm’s true pro￿t is ￿: Denoting this belief
as ￿ the condition for extortion becomes:
￿F￿ ￿ cK ￿ 0: (4)
Using Bayes’ Rule and denoting the probability that a pro￿table ￿rm evades as ￿i we can
derive the optimal strategy for a bad government observing a zero declaration.4 The extortion







1 if ￿i >
cK(1￿￿)
(F￿￿cK)￿
2 [0;1] if ￿i =
cK(1￿￿)
(F￿￿cK)￿




A good government does not want to extort, but has to decide whether to audit or not.
Given that a good government observes a declaration of ￿ it is a dominant strategy not to audit,
as no ￿nes would ever be collected after an audit:
a￿
g(￿g;di = ￿) = fnothingg:
We now turn to the case where a good government observes a zero declaration. The decision
of the government depends on ￿ the believed probability that a zero declaration comes from a
pro￿table ￿rm.5 Then a good government audits whenever
￿(f + t)￿ ￿ K > 0:
Using Bayes’ rule and denoting the equilibrium audit probability of a good government condi-
tional on di = 0 as ￿￿






1 if ￿i >
K(1￿￿)
￿(￿(f+t)￿K)
2 [0;1] if ￿i =
K(1￿￿)
￿(￿(f+t)￿K)
0 if ￿i <
K(1￿￿)
￿(￿(f+t)￿K)
We now turn to the ￿rm. It is a dominant strategy for an unpro￿table ￿rm to declare no pro￿t,
d￿
i(￿ = 0) = 0: A ￿rm anticipating the reaction of the two types of governments has the following
expected net pro￿ts from evasion and compliance:
E￿i(di = 0j￿ = ￿) = ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿
gF ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
g (f + t)
￿
E￿i(di = ￿j￿ = ￿) = ￿(1 ￿ t ￿ ￿F)
4The believed probability of facing a pro￿table ￿rm given a zero declaration is ￿ = ￿￿=(￿￿+1￿￿): This takes
into account that it never pays for a ￿rm to declare a pro￿t if it is not pro￿table.
5Note that in equilibrium the beliefs of good and bad governments have to be identical. So we can use the
same notation for both types.






1 if ￿g <
￿F(1￿￿g)+t
(1￿￿)(f+t)
2 [0;1] if ￿g =
￿F(1￿￿g)+t
(1￿￿)(f+t)
0 if ￿g >
￿F(1￿￿g)+t
(1￿￿)(f+t)
2.4 Parameter con￿gurations and equilibria
Di￿erent partitions in the parameter space lead to di￿erent equilibria. One equilibrium we can
rule out is totally mixed equilibrium. It is easy to see that for any parameter con￿guration
￿￿
g ￿ a￿
g holds, since the critical evasion probability for extortion (by a bad government) is
smaller than that for audits (by a good government). An evasion probability that makes the
good government indi￿erent induces extortion. Possible equilibria are:
1. The surrender-to-evasion equilibrium. If
K(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(￿ (f + t) ￿ K)
> 1
then a good government will never audit ￿￿
g = 0; and a pro￿table ￿rm will always evade
￿￿
i = 1 as 0 <
￿
t + F(1 ￿ ￿￿
g)
￿
=[(1 ￿ ￿)(f + t)] 8￿￿
g 2 [0;1]. Extortion is possible in this
equilibrium. Eq. (4) with ￿￿
i = 1 gives the condition for extortion
cK (1 ￿ ￿)
(F￿ ￿ cK)￿
￿ 1:
2. The audit-evasion equilibrium. If
K(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(￿ (f + t) ￿ K)
< 1 and
t
(1 ￿ ￿)(f + t)
> 1
then a pro￿table ￿rm will always evade (￿￿
i = 1); even though that a good government
will audit all zero declarations (￿￿
g = 1); which implies bad governments extorting with
certainty (￿￿
g = 1): This equilibrium is driven by a high probability of facing a crook
government. It pays to evade for high ￿ because the payo￿ will be higher under evasion if
extortion is certain. Note that there is a critical ￿ > 0 needed for this equilibrium to exist.
A ￿rm who understands that it will always be audited by a good government evades only
if there is a certain likelihood of facing a bad government that will extort.
3. Full-extortion mixed-evasion equilibrium. If
K(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(￿ (f + t) ￿ K)
￿ 1 and
t
(1 ￿ ￿)(f + t)
￿ 1
then both the pro￿table ￿rm and the good government will randomize. Solving the simul-













4In this equilibrium an increased prior probability of bad governments increases the equilib-
rium audit probability (d￿￿
g=d￿ > 0). The presence of bad governments provides incentives
for more evasion, which induces good governments to audit more frequently in order to
keep the ￿rm indi￿erent between evasion and truthful declaration. The expected welfare
loss for a good government, measured as its expected audit cost, is given by
E(K j ￿ = 0) =
tK
(1 ￿ ￿)(f + t)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿) +
K(1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿￿(f + t) ￿ K
￿
;
which increases in ￿. Also remarkable is that only bad governments make positve expected
pro￿ts in equilibrium. This shows how the potential existence of bad governments makes
life di￿cult for good governments.
3 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed tax-evasion decisions of ￿rms when extortion is possible. We showed
that the potential existence of bad, extortionist governments provides incentives for corporate tax
evasion, which undermines good governments’ ability to raise revenue. Moreover, the resources
wasted for enforcement increase with the likelihood of governments being bad. We conclude
that countries with evasion and extortion problems will receive a double-dividend from curbing
extortion - a better climate for investment and reduced expenditure for tax enforcement.
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